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Language Policy in Central Asia 
(Abstract) 
This study addresses language policy and language planning in the five Central 
Asian republics, former constituents of the Soviet Union. Language issues became crucial 
after the breakdown of the Soviet system, which completely changed the linguistic 
environment in the region. 
The study discusses two main issues related to the language planning in central 
Asia. The first section of the project describes the history of the region before 1917, when 
lifestyle patterns divided Central Asian residents into two groups, nomads (Kyrgyz, 
Kazak and Turkmen) and sedentary peoples (Tajik and Uzbek). 
After a brief discussion of schooling practices in pre-Soviet Central Asia, the 
paper describes Soviet schooling practices and language policies after 191 7. Soviet 
national policy included alphabetic transformations and innovations as well. The post-
Soviet language policy targets the introduction and use of native languages in schools, 
and organizations. The policies emphasize widespread teaching in native languages and 
their introduction in non-native primary and secondary schools. The study also describes 
how changes in the linguistic environment in the region affected the schooling practices 
in the region. All major stages oflanguage planning and construction in the region show 
that schools served as a laboratory for Soviet and post-Soviet experiments. 
The second section is devoted to exploration of the role of language in 
maintaining ethno-social stability in Central Asia. The section discusses in-migration and 
out-migration issues in the history of Central Asia. The intention is to explore whether 
the changes in the language use patterns cause in- and out-migration from the region. 
Introduction 
Purpose of the study 
This paper will examine language issues in the newly independent states of 
Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. 
Breakup of the Soviet system brought sovereignty along with economic disintegration. 
Today, these independent but economically weak states are struggling to find an 
appropriate solution for political, economic, social, cultural and language issues of the 
transition period. 
The paper will focus on language issues in a multicultural background, which add 
to current economic and financial constraints in these countries. Cultural and language 
issues became very crucial after the breakdown of the Soviet system, which perpetuated 
people's integration through Russian as a language of interethnic communication. 
Describing language-planning efforts, the paper will build on the history of language 
construction and planning in Central Asia before and during the Soviet regime. This 
study also focuses on the changes in language policies in education and related domains 
of language use. It will also highlight current dilemmas connected to language planning 
in the post-Soviet period. 
Background 
Central Asia occupies the central pan of the Eurasian landmass and extends from 
the Caspian Sea in the west to the border of western China in the east. It borders upon 
Russia in the north, and on Iran, Afghanistan, and China to the south. Central Asia 
consists of the republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. Ethnically and culturally, people i.n Central Asia come from Turkic and 
Mongol origin, although there are Tajiks who came from the Inda-European origin. By 
religion, the area is predominantly populated by Muslims. Below is the table that 
demonstrates the ethnic composition of countries in Central Asia. 
Ethnic composition of Central Asian countries (percentages) 
Kazakhstan 1 Uzbekistan' -r-Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan 1 Tajikistan' 
O/o O/o O/o O/o O/o 
1997 1989 1993 1989 1995 1989 1997 1989 1989 
Kazakh 50.6 39.7 4.1 NIA 2.0 NIA 0.9 NIA 0.2 
Uzbek 2.3 NIA 74.5 71.4 9.2 NIA 14.3 NIA 23 .5 
Turkmen - 77.0 72.0 - 0.4 
Kyrgyz 0.9 NIA 60.8 52.4 IT ____ 
Tajik 4.8 NIA 0.8 A 62.3 
Russian 32.2 37.8 6.9 8.3 6.7 9.5 15.3 21.5 7.6 
Karakalpak - 2.1 N/A - - -
Tatar · 1.8 NIA 2.6 NIA 0.8 NIA l.2 NIA 1.4 
·-German 1.9 5.8 0.1 NIA - 0.4 2.4 0.6 
Ukrainian 4.5 5.4 NIA 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.5 0.8 
·------
Baluchi 0.8 NIA 
~-....---- . 
··----Azeri 0.8 NIA 
·-
Armenian 0.8 NIA 
Jews OJ N/A 
Others 6.7 N/A 6.0 NIA 1.9 NIA 4.7 NIA N/A 
This table is formed using the data from two sources. Data for Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively updated compared to data for 
Tajikistan (see footnote). Data for 1989 reflect the demographic situation before the 
official dissolution of the Soviet government. The comparison of two sets of data for 
titular nations and populations of Ukrainians, Germans and Russians show significant 
changes in the demographic situation in Central Asian countries, specifically, rise in the 
population of titular nationalities, and decline in the populations of the minorities 
Notes and sources: 
1 Data for Kazakhstan ( 1997), Uzbekistan (1993), Turkmenistan (1995) and Kyrgyzstan ( 1997) are based 
on Smith, G. et all (1998). Nation-buJldu:1g in the QQSt-Soviet borderlands:. The politics of national 
identities. Cambridge: University Press; p. 153 
2 Data for Tajikistan is for 1989 taken from Glenn, J. ( J. 999). Ih~.-S.oviet l~a.9:_ in Central As.@. St 
Martin's Press, Inc. p. 151 
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mentioned above. For instance, number of Kazakhs increased from 39.7 percent in 1989 
to 50.6 percent in 1997. This rapid increase within eight years might be due to the out-
migration of European population: Gennans in 1997 made up only 1 .9 percent compared 
to 5.8 percent in 1989. Russian population decreased from 37.8 percent in 1989 to 32.2 
percent in 1997. Similar increase is encountered in the number of Kyrgyz people, who 
made up 60.8 percent in 1997 compared to 52.4 percent in 1989. Meanwhile, Russian 
population in Kyrgyzstan decreased from 21.5 percent in 1989 to 15 .3 percent in 1997. 
Another reason of the increase may be higher birth rates among native people in the 
region. Central Asian Muslims tend to have larger families compared to in-migrants. 
Another point is that populations of Azeri, Armenians and Baluchi are shown only for 
Turkmenistan, and ofKarakalpaks - for Uzbekistan. 
Linguistic composition 
The fact that the titular nations are the majority in the region allows making a 
conclusion that Central Asia is linguistically homogeneous. With exception of the Tajiks, 
Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen speak languages of the Turkic subfamily of Altaic 
languages. Tajik (Farsi) belongs to the Persian group oflndo-European languages. 
Kazakh is the state language of Kazakhstan and widely spoken across the country. 
Exception is the northern part of the country, which is dominated by speakers oflndo·· 
European languages, including Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and German. Kyrgyz is 
spoken in by Kyrgyz, who live in Kyrgyzstan, Fergana part of Uzbekistan, Murgab 
(Pamir) region of Tajikistan, and Kyrgyz minorities in Turkey, Afghanistan and China. 
The Turk.mens are more closely related to the Turks of Turkey than are the other major 
Central Asian peoples. The Karakalpaks, who form an autonomous republic within 
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Uzbekistan on southern shore of the Aral Sea, may be related to the Uzbeks ethnicalJy, 
but linguistically they are closer to the Kazaks (Comrie, 1981 ). 
Subsequent section of the project will describe different language situations 
resulted from different power regimes in the region. The sections will discuss policy of 
"korenizatsia" of the early Soviet government, which upgraded indigenous languages 
both in terms of their status and corpus. In-migration following the occupation of the 
Central Asian region by Tsarist, and later Soviet forces made Russian another major 
language in Central Asia, which later started its domination over titular languages. We 
also see that social and political transformations in the region in the post-Soviet era have 
brought about the revival of indigenous languages. 
4 
Literature review 
Before speaking about the languages, l would like to comment the on literature I 
have used to describe the linguistic environment in Central Asia. To make the discussion 
clearer, I would like to divide them into two groups depending on the purpose of the 
narrative: l. Soviet literature; 2. Western sources. I find all these sources ideologically-
bound and therefore, I would conclude that each narrative serves its own ideological goal. 
The intention of the Soviet literature is to underline the educational achievements of the 
Soviet regime in completely illiterate Central Asia. Western sources seem to be aimed at 
proving that Muslim Central Asia was doing quite well in terms of education before the 
Russian Tsarist Empire colonized it. According to western researchers, colonization did 
not end with the socio-political transformations of the late 1920s. I suppose that ideology 
is the major dimension that makes these two literature sources diverge. 
The findings the research has revealed include: (a) The importance of Bourdieu's 
theory about language being considered as a "cultural capital". The test of the linguistic 
abilities of upper and working class college students showed that the students from 
working class families achieved results equal to those of the upper-class students. This 
led the researchers to conclusion that exceptional abilities and attitudes of the working 
class students were due to their social background, which served as a ground to move 
forward, to advance further. According to Bourdieu, the students were influenced by the 
values of the dominant society, and were driven to achieve them (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 47). 
Accordingly, it explains why the members of a certain society come to value cultures, 
languages and speakers of those languages. Language of the dominant culture is an 
essential factor for outsiders in the struggle for social equality, particularly for upward 
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mobility. This theory is best to describe the agenda hidden behind the expansion of 
Russian language. (b) The role of social forces that influence and motivate language 
change. Evidence suggests that social and political forces can sometimes easily 
manipulate language-planning process and use the power of language as a means of 
expression, communication, coordination and control (Kaplan, 1997). Most studies 
(Desheriev, Rogov, Mathiasson, Krag, Haarman) demonstrate that Soviet language 
planning was an ideologically bound, top-down process. ( c) The prospects of linguistic 
environment in the region after the breakup of the Soviet system. In terms of prospects, it 
is interesting to note Koenig's extensive discussion of multiculturalism in Kyrgyzstan, 
Revie\ving various approaches to language problem in Kyrgyzstan, Koenig suggests 
using a multicultural approach in the light of cultural and linguistic diversity in the 
country. He views multiculturalism in Switzerland and Belgium as an appropriate model 
for Kyrgyzstan (Koenig, 2000). However, the solution of the problem is not as easy as 
Koenig suggests. John Anderson's research on current ethnic environment in Kyrgyzstan 
discloses potential conflicts around the language issue, and states that "preservation of 
ethnic harmony and ethnic peace" remains a major concern for the government 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 42) 
The way that most of the literature, specifically western sources describe the 
current language situation in Central Asia proves that the situation is being approached 
largely from a political perspective. Politicization of the issue becomes obvious from 
various efforts of external powers, which use language issues to shield their intentjons to 
become an influential political power in the region" lJ. Ozolin' s article on language issues 
in the post-Soviet Baltic states is titled ''Between Russian and European hegemony: 
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Current language policy in the Baltic states" (Ozolins, 2000) I think that this title 
describes best the current linguistic problems that Central Asian states are experiencing 
today. The only difference is that Russia and Turkey represent the hegemony in the 
context of Central Asia. This kind of comparative research is done by Alpatov, who 
presents an analysis of linguistic changes in the post-Soviet countries (Alpatov, 1997) 
Central Asian states are too small and do not have a long history of political 
independence to avoid the pressure. For instance, approaching the issue from Turkey's 
perspective, Tryjarski sees two major objectives in terms of languages in the region. The 
first intention is to introduce a modified Roman alphabet for use in all Turkic languages. 
The next step will be a selection or creation of a new lingua franca, which will facilitate 
communication among Turkic-speaking peoples. For the time being, Republican Turkish 
is seen as the only potential language to play the role of lingua franca (Tryjarski, l 998, p. 
110). The actuality of the situation is confirmed by incredibly extensive and detailed 
research that Gary Fouse conducted on language issues in the former Soviet republics. 
One of the key issues in Fouse's research is the conflict between Pan-Turkism arid Pan-
Slavism in Central Asia. Almost all findings of such researchers as Glenn, Wright, 
Anderson, and others indicate the pressure that Central Asian governments are 
experiencing today from Russia concerning the rights of Russian population residing in 
the region (Glenn, l 999; Wright, 2000; Anderson, 1999) 
In the case of Kazakhstan, Fiem1an's study demonstrates that Kazakhstan's 
geopolitical and economic position in the region shapes and politicizes the language 
issues. Kazakhstan's language policy is formulated to meet the interests of Kazak and 
Russians, because the latter comprise 48% of population, a major ethnicity in the country 
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(Fiem1an, 1997). The first language law of 1989 named Kazak as the state language and 
the Russian as the language of interethnic communication. After a series of protests and 
demonstrations of Russian people, legislative amendments of 1995 changed the status of 
the Russian to an official language to be used in certain sectors of economy (Glenn, 
1999). 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are building monolingual societies based only on 
the Uzbek and Turkrnen. Language reform in de-russifying Uzbekistan is being promoted 
through hiring and firing practices, which accentuate knowledge of the local language 
(Dollerup, 1998). According to Fouse, Uzbekistan is establishing close contacts with 
Turkey, and enjoying its assistance in the process of transition to the Turkish-style Latin 
alphabet (Fouse, 2000, p. 253) As the most populous nation in the region, Uzbekistan 
seems to draw a wide scale attention of researchers from different countries. Although 
some of the research has a repetitive nature, the majority of it is devoted to the 
examination of various aspects of political, economic and socio-cultural life in 
Uzbekistan. For instance, Wixman's field research on Muslim-Turkic versus Slavic-
Christian relations in Uzbekistan discloses interesting aspects of these relations. It reveals 
social boundaries that always existed between Uzbeks and Europeans (Wixman, ] 991) 
Another study by James Critchlow is entirely dedicated to multifaceted examination of 
Uzbek nation-building process starting from mid 1800s (Critchlow, 1991) 
In the case of Turkmenistan, research approaches differ in the light of its socio-
economic status, which separates and differentiates it from the neighbors like Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Labeling Turkmenistan as a "spoiler", Olcott states that it 
"has always been an anomaly in Central Asia" (Olcott, 1996, p. 14 7) Careful reading and 
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analysis of such statements as well as vocabulary choice help the reader see the 
ideological goal of Martha B. Olcott' s research and feel her antipathy to Russia. 
Turkmenistan is labeled a "spoiler" for a number of "unconditional" actions, including 
granting Russians the right of dual citizenship. She argues that this compromise of 
Turkmenistan was then used by Russia "to press the other Central Asian states for similar 
concessions" (Olcott, 1996, p. 147) I have also found some of her findings insensitive 
towards the countries under her research, because they appear as a tool to express her 
personal concerns about the policy of Russian government in Central Asia. She often uses 
particular words to label the countries. For instance, Tajikistan is labeled as "territorial 
loser" of the region (Olcott, 1996, p. 42). I think that Olcott realizes that she is writing 
this book not only for western readers. Territorial issue is an acute problem between 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and Tajikistan has only recently managed to restore the civil 
order after the civil war. I think that if accessed by Tajikistani radicals, Olcott's 
politically incorrect labeling will only contribute to the exacerbation of tense relationship 
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
As a state language, Tajik is a major component of Tajikistan's national policy 
after 1989. Atkin's extensive study on Tajikistan shows that the policy in Tajikistan is 
largely built on the aspirations to restore the historical links to languages spoken beyond 
Tajikistan's borders. Considering the links between Tajik and Persian (Tehran and Kabul 
Persian), the policy makers support adoption of Arabic alphabet for use in writing Tajik. 
Tajikistan's intention is to become a monolingual society by drawing in Persian to 
replace Russian and Uzbek influences. Russiar i.s deprived of all privileges, including its 
status of a language for interethnic communication. If Tajikistan ever adopts a bilingual 
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policy, then the second language will be UzbeU., which is spoken by a significant part of 
its population (Atkin, 1994). 
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Concepts of language policy and planning 
Language policy is a part of national policy of the state, which may or may not 
have a multiplicity of different language groups. However, this definition does not claim 
to be the most accurate description of the concept. Kaplan and Baldauf argue that 
language planning and language policy "represent two quite distinct aspects of the 
systemized language change process. Language planning is seen as an activity, which 
government carries out across the whole society. Kaplan and Baldauf state that language
policy implies activities, both of symbolic and substantive nature, at a number of levels 
(Kaplan, 1997, p. xi). For them, language planning is the top-level activity followed by 
language policy mechanisms that are worked out at lower levels. This statement 
challenges another definition of language policy and language planning formulated by 
Bugarski: 
The term language policy refers ... to the policy of a society in the area of 
linguistic communication - that is, the set of positions, principles and decisions 
reflecting that community's relationship to its verbal repertoire and 
communicative potential. Language planning is understood as a set of concrete 
measures taken within language policy to act on linguistic communication in a 
community, typically by directing the development of its languages (Schiffman, 
1996, p. 3) 
Bugarski 's definition is the best to reflect the language planning activities m 
Central Asian countries. language policy ii;\. Central Asia is the responsibility of the 
government, whereas language planning is seen as an implementation process, which is 
modeled by the lower stmctural units. All five: Central Asian republics declared the titular 
languages (Kyrgyz, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik arid Turkmen) official and adopted policies, 
which are aimed at enhancing the role of natiive languages and improving their use in all 
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spheres of state administration and at all other levels (Roy, 2000). "Titular" language is 
defined as "a language of an ethnos, whose name is used to identify a specific national or 
state system (Neroznak, 1999, p. 4). Neroznak's definition is different from Ferguson's 
"major' and "minor" languages, although theylboth imply one and the same phenomenon. 
Ferguson's criteria for identification of major language include: (a) the language must be 
spoken by more than 25 percent of the population residing in the country; (b) it must 
serve as an official language of the nation; (c);it must be used as a medium of instruction 
in over 50 percent of secondary schools (Ferguson, 1971, p. 159) 
Language policy is stated in constitut�ons, legal statutes, official statements, and 
other actions of governmental authorities. lmplementation efforts involve all efforts 
including writing of grammars and dictionciries, development of academic curricula, 
government funding of activities that will t;:nforce the use of the national language. 
Current efforts of the Central Asian states: on language policy and planning differ 
depending on the type of governments establi
;
shed after the demise of the Soviet system.
(Roy, 2000). They are facing the dilemmas :connected with the difficulty of making a 
choice between multiethnic/multilingual and monoethnic/monolingual options. 
Language situation
There are different definitions of "language situation" given by various scholars. 
The definition I have chosen for the project b�longs to Ferguson, who identifies 
"language situation" as a complete panorama of language use at a given time and place. 
The concept also includes such data as how m�ny and what kinds of languages are 
spoken in the area, and by how many people. Consideration is given to the circumstances 
l2 
of language use. The conception also covers th
l 
attitudes and beliefs about languages 
held by the members of the community (Ferguson, 1971, p. 61-64). 
In the context of Central Asia, I think tiat the language situation can be described 
as heterogeneous and homogenous simultaneoLly. Considering the roots of "titular" (the 
ones for whom the countries are named) langulges, we can say that Central Asia is 
I 
predominantly homogeneous, where mutually intelligible Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and 
Turkmen languages belong to Turkic subgrouJ of Altaic languages, and Tajik (Farsi) 
representing the Indo-European group (Kalznel, 1995) Titular Turkic languages are also 
encountered in China, Afghanistan, Turkey, 1rL. They are spoken by the descendants of 
I 
the pre�Soviet Turkic tribes, which fled from entral Asia after 1917 revolution, civil war 
and forced collectivization (Ferdinand, 1994; If.ossabi, 1994; Comrie, 1995) 
At the same time, Central Asia's langukge situation is heterogeneous due to the 
presence of minority languages that represent Lher than Turkic languages. For instance, 
Central Asia is a home for languages like Korlan, Dungan, Russian, Ukrainian and many 
other minority languages. 
Titular languages of Central Asia 
Kyrgyz is the official language of Kyrgyzstan, spoken by about 2 million people. 
The 1989 census showed that Kyrgyz in Kyrgtzstan make up about 52 percent of the 
country's population. Kyrgyz language belonJ to the northeastern branch of Turkic 
languages. It is used in education, mass medial cultural activities and publication. 
(Anderson, 1999; Kalzner, 1995; Comrie, 198 �; Fouse, 2000). Besides Kyrgyz-speaking 
areas in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz lJguage is also spoken by Kyrgyz people 
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residing in China, Afghanistan, and Turkey. (Fbrdinand, 1994, p. 76; Rossabi, 1994, 
p.34)
Like Kyrgyz, Kazakh belongs to the n rtheast group of Turkic languages. The 
1989 census showed that 97% o� Kazakh consr
ered Kazakh their first language. The 
Kazakhs comprise 46% of the country's population (Fouse, 2000, p. 271). There are also 
about one million Kazakh speakers in China, ld around 100.000 in Mongolia. Kazakh is 
used for all purposes in the society (Kalzner, l9 5; Comrie, l 9 81).
Uzbek used to be the third largest language of the USSR due to a large number of 
speakers: In the 1989 census, Uzbeks made ud 71 % of Uzbekistan's population, 98.3% of 
whom claimed Uzbek claimed as their native anguage. Another 1.5 million speakers 
reside in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan. (Kalzner, 1995; Comrie, 
1981). Under the Uzbekistan's Language LaJ Uzbek is a state language used in 
government work, education, publication, and administrative documentation (Fouse, 
2000,p.253) 
Turkmen is spoken by about 3 million people in Turkmenistan and by another 
million in Iran. Unlike Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek, Turkmen language belongs to the 
southeastern or Oghuz group of Turkic langujges alongside Azeri, Crimean Tatar and 
Anatolian Turkish. As a state language, TurkA1en is used in education, media, and 
administration (Kalzner, 1995; Fouse, 2000). 
Tajik is spoken by about 3.5 million people is Tajikistan. Unlike other Central 
Asian languages, Tajik does not belong to TJkic languages. It represents the Iranian 
language group, and therefore, is included intL the Indo-European family of languages. It 
is closely related to Farsi in Iran and Dari spoken in Northern Afghanistan. According to 
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the 1996 Language Law of Tajikistan, Tajik is the only state language used in 
government work, education, mass media and ublications. (Kalzner, 1995; Fouse, 2000) 
Minority languages 
Historically and currently, all five countries share the same minor ethnic groups, 
though they may differ in quantities. Traditio+ly, the region is co-inhabited by Uigurs, 
Kalmyks, Dungans, and Turkish people. The 
l
ews, Tatars, Ukrainians, Germans, 
Chechens and some other Caucasian ethnic groups were driven to the region as a result of 
the World War II. Russians and Kossaks enteld the region in the middle of the 
nineteenth century with the initial attempts of lussia to conquer the region (Khalfin, 
1965) 
There are two major ethnic minorities :"n Kyrgyzstan. In the 1989 census, 
Russians made up 22% followed by Uzbeks - 13%. Other groups include Ukrainians, 
Tatars, Germans, Uigurs, Dungans, Tajiks and Kazakhs (Anderson, 1999, p. 42; Krag, 
1984; Menges, 1967). Out of 5.4 million peodie, Tajiks comprise 58.8% followed by 
minority group, have been settled in the coun ry fur up to three centuries and dominate 
the northern regions of the country (Undelan , 1994, p. 31 ). Turkmenistan's major ethnic 
group is presented by Uzbeks (9%), who live rredominantly in the areas bordering 
Uzbekistan. (Fierman, 1997, p. 2). Apart from Russians comprising 8 percent of the 
country's population, Uzbekistan has to deal lith Tajiks, who predominantly reside in 
ancient cities of Samarkand and Bukhara Unleland., 1994). Besides non-Asian minorities, 
Tajiks and Uzbeks, Turkmens and Uzbeks, KLakhs and Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, 
and Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in each other's colntries as minorities. 
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In all five countries of Central Asia, tJ languages of minor ethnic groups are 
provided with specific rights. For instance, Dulgan is a medium of instruction and taught 
as a subject in Dungan schools in Kyrgyzstan. Similar rights are guaranteed for Uigurs in 
Kyrgyzstan, Germans in Kazakhstan and Koreans in Uzbekistan. (Krag, 1984) 
16 
Language in education 
Pre-Soviet Central Asia: Historical backgro_�� 
The present Central Asian countries wte once referred to as Turkestan at the time 
of the Russian Imperial invasion in the 19th ceLury. The political system in the region 
was built on the principles of loyalty to Islam and was administered by the emirates 
located in Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva. There were ethnic groupings of people under the 
names Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Turkrnen and Tajik, but they did not have the political 
connotation that they have today. They occupied the territory of Turkestan, which did not 
stand for a state based on a specific ethnic or linguistic association (Roy, 2000, p. 3) 
Central Asia has always been and still is viewed as one geopolitical unity, which 
is integrated by its geographic territory, historical background, economic relations, 
ethnocultural and religious commonalties. People's lifestyle divided them into two 
groups, nomads (Kyrgyz, Kazak and Turkmen) and sedentary (Tajik and Uzbek}. Their 
commonalities affect people's lifestyle and values and make them racially and culturally 
different from other nationalities, which formed the so-called "Soviet people". 
Historically and currently, all five countries share the same smaller ethnic groups, though 
they may differ in quantities. Traditionally, the region is co-inhabited by Uigurs, 
Karakalpaks and other Turkic tribes. The Jews, Tatars, Ukrainians, Germans, Chechens 
and some other Caucasian ethnic groups were.driven to the region as a result of the 
World War [I. Russians and Kossaks entered the region in the middle of the nineteenth 
century with the initial attempts of Russia to conquer the region (Khalfin, 1965) 
Tsarist Russia started its expansi.on to Central Asia in the mid-1850s. Answering 
the question of why Tsarist Russia moved to Central Asia, Khalfin indicates historical 
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reasons: Russia's defeat in the 1853-1856 Crimean War being the major one. Having lost 
its influence in the Balkans and Near East, Russia shifted its focus to Central Asian 
kingdoms, which had regular commercial ties with her (Khalfin, 1965, p.82). Russia 
looked down on the economically backward and politically weak Central Asia as a new 
market and wealth of different resources. Central Asia of the mid-1850s was an object of 
contest between Russian imperialism and Britiish Empire, which was approaching the 
region through India. Between 1857 and 1862,! forced by active military and political 
expansion of Britain, Russia had to accelerate its conquest of Kazakh steppes, territory 
under Kyrgyz, Tashkent and Samarkand king(\oms. By 1867, Russia annexed the Kazakh 
territory and Turkestan region as a territorial and administrative unit of Russian 
Federation (Khalfin, 1965). 
Linguistic environment before 1917 
Before speaking about the languages I would like to comment the on literature I 
used to describe the pre-Soviet linguistic environment in Central Asia. To make the 
discussion clearer, I would like to divide theill into two groups depending on the purpose 
of the narrative: 1. Soviet literature; 2. Western sources. I find all these sources 
ideologically-bound and therefore, I would coµclude that each narrative serves its own 
ideological goal accordingly. The intention otthe Soviet literature is to underline the 
educational achievements of the Soviet regime in completely illiterate Central Asia. 
Western sources seem to be aimed at proving that Muslim Central Asia was doing quite 
well in terms of education before the Russian Tsarist Empire colonized it. Colonization 
did not end with the socio-political transform<)-tions of the late 1920s. I suppose that 
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ideology is likely to be the major dimension that makes these three literature sources 
diverge. 
Pre-and post-Soviet Central Asia has two major language groups: 1. Turkic, 
which includes Kyrgyz, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Uigur, and; 2. Iranian, which is largely 
represented by Tajiks and other minorities in the Pamirs of Tajikistan. Other minor 
languages include Korean, Chinese, Kalmyk, Kurdish and Karakalpak. Slavic languages 
entered the region starting from the mid-1850s, when Tsarist Russian expanded its 
domination to the area. Before 1917, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazaks and Uigurs used Arabic­
based alphabet, which was built on medieval dialects of Uzbek and Tajik languages and 
therefore was elitist, sophisticated and not widely accessible. They failed to reflect the 
realities of the modem indigenous languages and dialects. (Wheeler, 1962; Bacon, l 966). 
Also, administrators of various kingdoms in the sedentary areas used Persian. 
(Mathiasson, 1984) Arabic and Persian heavily influenced pre-Soviet Central Asian 
languages because of Islam expansion and corpmercial ties with Persian-speaking people. 
Education in Central Asia before 191 7 
There were two types of schools in Turkestan at that time: the primary schools 
(Mekteb) and the higher schools, (Medreseh·r;eltgious seminaries). In Turkestan, Arabic 
was the primary language of instruction in thei schools, although some teaching was also 
done in Persian, which was used by the urban intelligentsia in writing and oral 
communication. The condition of mektebs wa� unsatisfactory. They were located in the 
mosques, where the students were taught to re'ad and write in Arabic and learned 
religious texts by rote. The number of student� in the mektebs was few. In 1899, there 
were 4, 632 mektebs with 44,773 students in Syr-Darya, Samarkand and Fergana regions. 
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The length of schooling was from to two to five years (Pierce, 1960). Kreindler argues 
that the students had little understanding of what they read because, first of all, Arabic 
was not a native language for them and, seconply, they spent most of their time on 
memorizing the passages from the Koran. Only a limited number of students from rich 
families could continue the studies in Medresehs after finishing the course of study in the 
Mektebs. 
Meddresehs were located mostly in Bti;khara, Khiva, Samarkand, and the Fergana 
Valley. They prepared young people, primarily men for carrying on Muslim education 
throughout Central Asia. Medreseh students were provided with small allowances. The 
curriculum in the Medresehs included mainly courses in Arabic, philosophy, theology, 
and the Shariat. Other academic disciplines were Persian, Turkish, logic, arithmetic, 
legends and fables and geography. The length;of study in the Medresehs varied from 
student to student. Some students stayed there all their lives. After going through 
Medreseh, a person was considered an educattrd man, and was qualified to become a 
teacher in the Mektebs or serve in the mosques. Medreseh graduates were expected to 
have a good command of Turkic languages as well as Persian and Arabic literary 
languages. They were offered a comprehensiv� training in the great writings of the poets, 
theologians, philosophers, historians, and geographers of the Islam-dominated world. The 
graduates also served as secretaries to merchants, nobility, a judge or law clerk (Allworth, 
1967; Pierce, 1960) 
Before 1917, Kyrgyz were the most b�ck ward people. Like the Turkmen, Kyrgyz 
had fewer educational centers because of their dispersal and relatively small numbers 
(All worth, 1967). In 1914 there were only 107 schools and one gymnasium, which were 
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open only for children of local officials, rich f4milies and religious leaders. There were 
also some vocational schools and a high schodl, which did not educate any Kyrgyz 
between 1879 and 1914 (Isayev, 1979). This shows exploitative nature of both Tsarist 
Russians and local elite, which prevented culttitral awareness of indigenous people 
through education. Thus, before 1917, Kyrgyz were mostly illiterate at a large with the 
exception of religious leaders. Kyrgyz people did not have a written language of their 
own. Legends, stories, poems and songs were prally handed down from generation to 
generation. 
The educational system in the Kazakh steppes was different than in Turkestan or 
Fergana oasis. Pierce's research on the languages in pre-Soviet Central Asia shows that 
the Kazakh students were taught in the Tatar language by Tatar mullas (mosque leaders) 
in the tradition of Islam. In the 1820s, the Russian authorities started educating the 
Kazaks in the Russian schools. For the training of translators and interpreters needed by 
the administration for the courts and various offices, special Russian-Kazakh-Kirgiz 
schools were established. These schools taught Russian together with other local 
languages, the principles of Islam and the elements of arithmetic, history and geography. 
These schools would admit children from Russian families and better-off native families. 
By assisting the spread of the Russian language and culture, these schools played a 
progressive role in the education of indigenous people. They trained translators, 
administrative workers capable of leading agriculture and trade. Between 1885 and 1909, 
there appeared 90 such schools in Turkestan (Central Asian Review, 1956, p. 38, 242). 
However, because of the limited number of facilities and even fewer Kazakhs willing to 
overcome the cultural and linguistic barriers necessary for attendance, the education of 
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the indigenous people was not fully successful. Extensive research made by Pierce shows 
that starting from the 1850s, the intention of the Russian authorities was changed to 
establish schools where the Kazakh language would become the primary language of 
instruction. They established "au] schools" (village schools) based on the model of 
Russian elementary schools. These schools moved around with communities during the 
summer migration and stayed with them in winter camps to provide education all the year 
round. After finishing village schools, the students would continue the studies in the one­
class volost (region) schools or the two-class "Russian-Kirgiz" schools. The students who 
wanted to study further went on to Russian city school or to the Orenburg Kirgiz teacher 
school to be eligible to teach in the village schools (Pierce, 1960) 
Besides, there were also Russian elementary, middle and high schools, which 
were attended by the children of Russian officials, settlers and a few native children. In 
1896, in the boys' school in Tashkent, only 10 percent of 327 students were natives, and 
in the girls' school 8 out of 3 77. There were only 65 native students among 415 students 
of the Tashkent teachers' seminary, which was established in 1879 (Central Asian 
Review, 1956, p. 39) 
According to Desheriev, in pre-Soviet Central Asia, different written languages 
served different social purposes and classes. 11-rabic served religious purposes whereas 
local officials working in the Tsarist Russian institutions used Russian. Elites and 
merchants were satisfied with Persian language, which was a useful tool in their cross­
cultural trading businesses. There were a limited number of schools, where instruction 
was conducted in one of the local languages. There were very few literate people in major 
indigenous languages. Their development was hindered by the division of Turkic-
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speaking people into numerous tribes and clans, which possessed their own dialects and 
subdialects. (lsayev, 1977, p.84-92) 
As we see, because of the years of foreign domination and invasion, the peoples 
of Central Asia were mainly undifferentiated in terms of statehood, their own national 
language and scripts. This would later begin tq change with the start of socio-political 
transformations, spread of education and modernization. 
Soviet language policy 
"Korenizatsia"* 3 - Building on native languages
As an important component of the Soviet government's national policy, language 
policy was shaped by the communist ideolog)j, which dominated in all member republics 
of the system (lsayev, 1979, p. 7). Between 1 �21 and 1926, the so-called Turkestan was 
divided into five republics on the basis of ethnicity and nationality. The Soviet regime 
considered the " ... linguistic regimentation asi one of the most important instruments in 
the moulding of the new society" (Wheeler, 1962, p. 35). 
Early language policy was built on the "Declaration of Rights of the Nations of 
Russia", which was signed by Lenin in 1917 (Rogov, 1966, p.11). This Declaration 
announced equal rights of all nations for self-determination, and provided freedom to 
ethnic minorities for development ln its earlyr period, Communist rule served to promote 
national identity of indigenous people in the region. Introducing the concept of 
"Korenizatsia", Lenin took the view that the most effective way of spreading Communist 
ideas was via the conduit of the various natio*al languages in the new empire (see 
3 "Korenizatsia" is a part of Soviet nationality policy that encouraged use of native languages. The tem1 
"'korenizatsia" is derived from the Russian word "koreh" -·"root", implying the process of language 
construction should start from the roots, indigenous Ia11-guages. 
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footnote). Lenin stressed the necessity oflanguage maintenance and education in mother 
tongue as a precondition of national liberation (Krag, 1984, p. 61 ). Some western 
researchers now interpret this process as a Soviet version of Affirmative Action (Glenn, 
1999) 
During the 1920s ethnic consciousnes� was encouraged. Rogov points to two 
major goals of the Soviet government in term� of language reform. The Soviets intended 
to replace sophisticated "non-mass" alphabetsiby new ones, which would be widely 
accessible and match modern theories of literacy. Rogov also brings in theoretical, 
sociological and political arguments of educating people through indigenous languages. 
First, mother tongue is widely accessible and understandable to all social classes. Second, 
Soviets intended to educate and train indigenous cadres. This view is supported by 
Kaiser, who also states "the major task in the yarly years of Soviet power was to educate 
the Turkic-Muslim nationalities in central Asia in an effort to create an indigenous 
proletarian element loyal to the socialist state" (Kaiser, 1992, p. 254 ). Therefore, 
indigenous languages were found to be the right environment for native students to study. 
Third, this process was conducted according tb the new policy, which implied 
development of national cultures. Accordingly, it was assumed that indigenous languages 
are the best tools to reflect national identity arid to transmit local cultures and values 
(Rogov, 1966,p.11-12). 
National policy of the early Soviet government provided indigenous cultures like 
Kyrgyz and Kazak with their written languages. They have developed from "mere 
vernaculars to standard languages" (Krag, 19a4, p. 59). The new written languages were 
built based on the modified languages and dialects that were widely spread across the 
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region. For instance, Tashkent dialect of Uzbek was selected as a basis for the new 
written Uzbek languages out of other two major dialects in Uzbekistan: Bukhara and 
Samarkand dialects (Desheriev, 1968, p. 7). Similar statement is also made by Glenn, 
whose extended research on Soviet Central Asia demonstrated that the Soviet language 
policy "highlights the rather arbitrary method in choosing the basis for new literary 
languages; secondly, it emphasizes the role of the state in creation of the national 
languages of the region" (Glenn, 1999, p. 55) 
Another goal was to construct alphabets for cultures, which did not have a written 
language at all. This demonstrates that the early Soviet language policy was implemented 
at both status and corpus levels. Between 1917 and 1926, Arabic alphabet was used in 
Central Asia despite its inability to convey some of the Turkic phonemes. Starting from 
1926, Latin was introduced because it was assumed to have more potential to eliminate 
existing alphabetical deficits of Arabic origin. The political and ideological reason for 
this replacement was divergence between the large number of illiterate but potential 
Soviet citizens, and elitist nature of Arabic alphabet. Soviet newspapers in Arabic did not 
reach a wide mass of illiterate people and were being wasted on economically well off 
families, who were not in favor of political and social transformation in the region, 
Arabic and Persian loan words were removed from the indigenous vocabulary because 
they were associated with Islam, which did not match the Soviet policy about equal 
positions of all nations in the country. Latin script was used until late 1930s before it was 
replaced by Cyrillic alphabet (Wheeler, 1962, p. 36). 
Literature review shows that there were serious political reasons as well as an 
economic rationale for why Latin was later replaced by Cyrillic alphabet. Here again, the 
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opinions and interpretations diverge because of pro and anti-Soviet ideologies. Western 
sources indicate that theories about the emergence of "Soviet people" and co­
development of national cultures into a socialist culture served to disguise the efforts to 
merge national minorities into the Russian culture. The proponents of the concept 
supported efforts to cultivate use of the Russian language and Russian school practices 
among non-Russian peoples (Roy, 2000; Glenn, 1999). Soviet sources point out that the 
Soviet government's intention to build a tightly integrated and centrally planned 
economy led to the necessity of a common language for inter-republican communication, 
It was the first step of official promotion of Russian, which became the language of 
Soviet administration in Central Asia. Political and ideological reasons included the 
necessity of integrated cooperation of Bolsheviks from different republics to protect the 
communistic ideas and counter bourgeois ideology (Isayev, 1979, p. 255). 
One of the ideological reasons for the shift to Cyrillic script was the policy of 
Northern Russian minority schools towards Russian language. Since Latin was 
announced as the alphabet of global communism, non-Russian schools used Latin scripts, 
and were cautious not to borrow from the Russian. For them, Russian had an association 
with policy of russification of Tsarist Russia. National policy has provoked nationalistic 
movements in Ukraine against Russia and the Russian language (Isayev, 1979, p. 255). 
This is contradicted by Fouse, who states that in Central Asia, the change from Latin to 
Cyrillic was made merely because of political reasons - to distance the Soviet Muslims 
from the West and Turkey (the latter adopting the Latin script), and to enhance learning 
of Russian (Fouse, 2000; Rywkin, 1990). These alphabet changes closed doors for 
younger generations of Central Asians to the literature of their ancestors (Glenn, 1999; 
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Fouse, 2000). Bruchis' interpretation is related to the Communist Party's primary goal, 
which was aimed at further distancing each of the Central Asian language from its Arab­
Iranian roots, and enhancing "a broad penetration into these languages of a stream of 
Russian words and syntactic models" (Bruchis, 1984, p. 13 7) 
The Soviet government's early language policy contributed to a rapid rise in the 
level of educational attainment in Central Asia. In 1926, there were only "about 7 percent 
of the Central Asian men and less that one percent of women were literate compared to 
one-half of Russian males and one-third of Russian females" (Kaiser, 1992, p·. 254). In 
the context of Kazakhstan, before 1917, there were 94 percent people illiterate. In 1933, 
there were 6, 869 schools with 576.000 children (Central Asia Review, 1954, p. 84). By 
1985, universal literacy rate has been achieved and over two-thirds of the population aged 
10 years and older had a higher or secondary education (Kaiser, 1992 ). 
The concept of "Soviet people" 
Russian language was at the core of the concept of "Soviet people" that emerged 
in the 1930s and redirected Lenin's national policy, leading to further arguments about 
necessity of introducing a common alphabet for the region. Russian became the language 
of the Bolsheviks and later Communists, whose policy was aimed at making it a language 
of interethnic communication. However, this was opposed by non-Russian people, for 
whom Russian was seen as a mirror image of the Tsarist policy ofrussification or Great 
Russian chauvinism. The situation was complicated by the national policy, which 
provoked nationalistic movements in non-Russian states. For instance, an opposition to 
Russia and the Russian language was observed in Ukraine (lsayev, 1979, p. 255). 
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To prevent the spread of anti-Russian sentiments across the country, Communist 
Party adopted a decree in March 1938, which stated that "establishing special national 
schools has caused significant losses to the principles of proper education and training of 
children by distancing them from Soviet life, Soviet culture and science, and preventing 
them from furthering their studies in higher educational institutions" (Garkavets, 1990, p. 
74). This decree targeted compulsory introduction of Russian into non-Russian school 
curriculum. It was the first step in developing a centralized curriculum for schools in all 
member republics (lsayev, 1979, p. 260). This decree is also considered to be the initial 
stage of promoting Soviet policy of bilingualism (Smith, 1999). The 193 8 decree was 
followed by similar resolutions made by the Communist Party leaders in Central Asia. 
For instance, Kazakhstan Communist Party's 193 8 decree required reorganization of all 
national schools. As a result, introducing Russian as a medium of instruction reorganized 
59 Uzbek, 46 Uigur, 7 Tajik, 25 Tatar, 3 Azerbaijani, and many other national schools 
(Garkavets, 1990, p. 74). Schools in Central Asia used the curriculum, which was directly 
dedicated to shaping the orientation toward Soviet national culture based on Russian 
culture and lifestyle because the latter was assumed to reflect higher moral standards by 
serving as a model for others. Thus, school reforms and policies of the 1930s worked to 
transform indigenous Kyrgyz, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen people into "Soviet 
people". Educational and ideological policy was dedicated to integrating the largely rural, 
indigenous majority into supposed Soviet culture. 
After the World War II, Russian language expanded its functions and domination 
with official backing of the Soviet government The war between 1939 and 1945 brought 
a lot of voluntary and involuntary migrants to the region. Prior to German invasion in 
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1991, many manufacturing plants were relocated to Central Asian capital cities together 
with their workers. This significantly contributed to Russian's becoming a leading 
language. Starting from the early 1970s, bilingualism became the core of the official· 
language policy, working to create multinational culture under the name "Soviet people". 
Ten years later Russian became language of administration, official documentation and 
instruction media in higher educational institutions of Central Asia. It became a dominant 
language in the capitals of all five republics, because the majority of Russians and other 
Slavs was concentrated in the urban areas. Traditionally agricultural, indigenous people 
of the region remained in the rural areas, whereas outsiders, who made use of the major 
part of modern achievements, intensively inhabited urban areas. As a result, native 
languages were left to become an instruction medium in rural schools. 
Language in education: Russian langua_g�y�rsus Indigenous languages 
Modern type of formal schooling in the region began during the Soviet period, 
since the 1930s. Soviet authorities undertook wide scale measures to transmit and spread 
Soviet culture among Muslims. They considered education as an important agent in 
implementing political, economic, and social transformations (Medlin, 1971, p. 8). 
Educational policy was created in and directed from Moscow, which would 
determine specializations to be taught either in the local languages or in Russian. The 
language of education in Soviet Central Asia distinctively divided schools into two 
groups: 1. national schools or "groups", where teaching was conducted in indigenous 
languages, and; 2. schools with Russian language as the medium of instrnction .. Schools 
teaching in national languages are located m.ostly in the rural areas, where there is high 
concentration of a particular nationality. As was mentioned earlier, traditional agricultural 
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lifestyle has always kept indigenous people of Central Asia in the rural areas. These 
schools had native languages as a medium of instruction and Russian as a compulsory 
subject (Krag, 1984, p. 71; Glenn, 1999) 
The Soviet government encouraged the learning of Russian by including it as a 
subject in the curricula of all non-Russian schools and higher and specialized secondary 
educational institutions (Desheriev, 1968). While official policy in indigenous-language 
secondary schools ai~ed at bilingualism like Kyrgyz-Russian, Russian-language schools 
oriented only to monolingualism. Russians rarely learned the national languages of the 
area to which they migrated, even if it was taught at schools (Krag, 1984; Smith, 1998; 
Rywkin, 1990) 
There were also mixed secondary schools, where children were taught in their 
own language, but they mix during the breaks, in interest groups and various school 
meetings and events. This provided an opportunity for non-Russian children to talk and 
master Russian. In 1962 there were about 300 mixed schools in Kyrgyzstan and 1.962 in 
Kazakhstan. Boarding schools also provided greater opportunities for the non-Russian 
children to master Russian (Garkavets, 1990). Mixed schools were the initial results of 
the Inter-Republican Conferences on the study of Russian in national schools that were 
held 1956 (Central Asian Review, 1958, p. 3 l 0). Therefore, my assumption is that the 
number of mixed schools had significantly increased by the 1980s. 
ln terms of medium of instruction, higher education was totally different from the 
secondary school level. Higher education represented the level, which would completely 
meet the requirements of the assimilation program. Students from minority language 
groups had to continue their studies in Russian. The minority languages were not even 
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offered as an optional subject. The language of instruction was mainly Russian, although 
there were departments where some courses were given in indigenous languages. Russian 
alone was used as the language of instruction in specialized institutions like Polytechnics, 
Architecture and Construction, Topography and Hydrometeorology. All these institutions 
were located in the capital cities. Russian and native languages were taught everywhere 
else, sometimes varying according to the nationality of the instructor (Wheeler, 1962). 
For instance, in Tajikistan, fields like Oriental Studies, History and Pedagogy were 
available in Tajik language (Fouse, 2000). There are also other languages of instruction 
in the region. Teacher training schools in Khodzeili (Uzbekistan) use Kara-Kalpak, 
Kazakh, Uzbek and Russian. The Chimbai (Kazakhstan) schools for training primary 
teachers use Kara-Kalpak, Kazakh, and Russian. Many institutes located in the border 
areas between the countries use the languages of people inhabiting those areas. This 
shows that smaller ethnic groups also enjoyed cultural rights, including educational and 
publishing facilities in their own languages in areas in which they formed substantial, 
compact communities (Wheeler, 1962). 
Knowledge of Russian was required for entry to VUZ4. The examination for 
entrance to VUZ (see footnote) was conducted in writing in Russian. Many applicants 
from the rural national schools would fall down on the Russian language paper because 
of their limited knowledge of Russian. Therefore, to prevent this, many parents in cities 
and towns would send their children to Russian-language elementary and secondary 
schools, realizing the advantages of a thorough knowledge of Russian" The status of 
Russian was enhanced as a result of 1958-59 educational reform laws that offered parents 
4 VUZ - ('vysshee uchebnoe zavedenie) implies a higher educational institution 
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a choice when sending their children to schools depending on the language used as a 
medium of instruction (Glenn, 1999, p. 83; Wright, 2000) 
Russian language was seen as an indispensable tool for further advancement, and 
therefore, despite good quality of education in local institutes, the prospect of receiving 
higher education in Central Russia and other capital cities would make students work 
hard to master Russian. Russian was seen as a prerequisite for social mobility. Education 
earned in Russian in leading cities of Russia would rate high in obtaining well-paid and 
prestigious positions in the society (Glenn, 1999). Therefore, indigenous cadres, 
particularly urban elite would compete hard to enter VUZ (see footnote) in Russia. 
Today's result of this competition is Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, who had to 
undergo intensive language training because oflack of fluent command of Uzbek (Fouse, 
2000, p. 252). Three of the five current presidents of Central Asian republics were 
educated in Russia. In the first years of independence, there was a need for native 
language tutoring for them to learn to speak publicly (Undeland, 1994, p. 8) Akaev, 
Kyrgyzstan's president does not seem to know that Russian and Kyrgyz belong to 
different language families, and each language has its own unique style, way of 
constrncting sentences. Constructing phrases in the Russian style is now considered to be 
a kind of fashion among political elites. Even leaders, for whom Kyrgyz is the first 
language, tend to follow Akaev's style. 
Imposition of Russian language as a means of upward mobility and 
communication between the indigenous peoples of Central Asia stratified the society into 
rural and urban people depending on how well people spoke Russian. Since population 
mixture was low and schools operated in native languages, rural level of Russian 
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language was low. Urban people were more inclined to use Russian in professional 
relations, in correspondence, in reading literature and newspapers, watching TV, etc. 
Urban people would ridicule rural people for speaking Russian with poor accent 
(Undeland, 1994, p. 8). 
The situation remained unchanged until "perestroika and glasnost" came in 1985, 
and provoked national movements all over the country, leading eventually to the breakup 
of the system (Kreindler, 1989, p. 56). Kreindler's description of the language situation in 
the Soviet Union on the eve of "perestroika" is true to Central Asian republics as well: 
The position of national languages in the Brezhnev period was eroding as Russian 
expanded its role in the schools, in party and state offices, in publishing and in the 
economy, While the Leninist theory oflanguage equality was never repudiated 
and national languages were not attacked directly, it was Russian, a major world 
language that was lavishly and vigorously being promoted by the state. The view 
that national culture and national language need not necessarily coincide, that 
Russian alone can fulfill most cultural needs continued to gain ground. Giving up 
one's language and shifting to Russian was now deemed "progressive", "mature", 
"according to the laws of natural development" (Kreindler, 1989, p. 56) 
Education and social mobility from ethnic perspective 
Current debates on education and social mobility from ethnic perspectives lead to 
conclusions, which completely ignore the past. These conclusions are often superficial 
and serve to support the ideology of either of the debating parties, in our case, Central 
Asians or the Slavs. Slavs argue that there were strong incentives for indigenous students, 
although Soviet authorities were said to provide equal education to Russian and Muslim 
children, They claim that indigenous students enjoy advantages like easier admission and 
more lenient grading at the universities. As an example, they indicate the 1986 survey 
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conducted in West Germany among Volga German emigrants from Central Asia 
mentioned nationality as a key factor in admissions to VUZ in the region (Rywkin, 1990, 
p. 104) The other party claim that these incentives were introduced later in the postwar 
period, when there appeared a need to train more indigenous cadres. By that time when 
the incentives were introduced, non-Asians came to dominate the professional 
environment. It was the result of the educational policy of the early Soviet government 
Between 1917 and 1950, the Soviet government concentrated on overall literacy 
campaign in the region to generate members of the new socialist society. It was not the 
task to train the local people for various occupations. Therefore, before the 1950s the 
only non-Asian migrants benefited from specialized professional education (Medlin, 
1971, p. 113) 
According to Rywkin, problem of cadres was the most "fertile ground for 
Muslim-Russian conflicts. Previously, indigenous people always leaned toward farming 
leaving urban and industrial sector to be dominated by the Europeans. A contributory 
factor to this stratification was imposition of Russian language as a means of upward 
mobility and communication between the indigenous peoples of Central Asia that divided 
the society into rural and urban people depending on how well people spoke Russian. 
Ethno-demographic study conducted in Central Asia in 1979 showed that urban Uzbeks 
in Uzbekistan made up only 28 percent of Uzbeks living in the country. Respective 
figures for other major Central Asian nationalities were: 19. 6 percent - Kyrgyz, 31.6 -
Kazakh, 32.3 percent--Turkmen, and 29.2--Tajik (Wixman, 1991, p. 168). Comparison 
drawn between this data and the more recent figures for l 989 shows increase in the 
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number of urbanized indigenous people: Kazakh- 57 percent, Kyrgyz- 38 percent, 
Uzbek- 41 percent, Turkmen- 45 percent Tajik 33 percent (Glenn, 1999, p. 151) 
Later, by the early ] 970s, increase in educational opportunities and social 
transformations have led indigenous people to reassess the employment possibilities in 
the region. They became more oriented towards urban, industrial careers (Rywkin, 1990, 
p. 117) Kaiser's research on social mobilization in Uzbekistan shows percentage of 
Uzbek students in polytechnic institutes rose from 41 percent in 1970 to 53 percent in 
1979 For Kaiser, this is a proof for the fact that "young Central Asians are no longer 
willing to pursue traditional careers for which they have a secure niche, but rather are 
increasingly oriented towards high-status positions in the modernized sectors of Soviet 
Central Asia that have until now been dominated by Russians and other nonindigenes" 
(Kaiser, 1992, p. 256) Higher educational attainments and increasing fluency in Russian 
allowed them to compete with the Russians who stood in the way of further upward 
mobility. As indigenous cadres, they had more chance for employment. Accordingly, this 
competition for desirable and well-paid jobs and priorities given to the indigenous 
specialists has caused opposition, which acquired national and religious nature. 
Both parties had plentiful arguments and claims related to the situation. Their 
assessment of the situation greatly differed because of varying perspectives. Wixman's 
study of the relationship between the Uzbeks and Slavs presents a detailed picture of the 
situation. All the arguments are of economic nature and are often related to competition 
for well-paid jobs and housing. The study was conducted m 1985 and therefore, language 
does not seem to be a tool for discrimination. It is rather ethnicity, which is often stated 
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by the respondents: discrimination in hiring practice based on ethnic affiliations 
(Wixman, 1991 ). 
No matter what the opposing arguments were, the employment policy in Soviet 
Central Asia was not officially discriminatory. Although it provided an official backing 
for Russian language, Soviet policy of employment was based on the development of 
native cadres. For the Soviet Government, Russian language served as a tool for 
consolidating different ethnicities into "Soviet nation" 
Challenges of post-Soviet Central Asia 
After the breakup of the Soviet system, the power in the states of Central Asia 
was taken over by the leaders who declared sovereignty and adopted laws about the 
national languages. The new states relied heavily on the aspirations and movements of 
people for economic independence and ethnocultural revival. To some extent, they 
provided the reasons why the current language situation in Central Asia is being 
approached largely from a political perspective. Politicization of the issue becomes 
obvious from various efforts of external powers, which use language issues to shield their 
intentions to become an influential political power in the region. The states are too small 
to avoid the pressure. For instance, approaching the issue from Turkey's perspective, 
Tryjarski sees two major objectives in terms oflanguages in the region. The first 
intention is to introduce a modified Roman alphabet for use in all Turkic languages. The 
next step will be a selection or creation of a new lingua franca, which will facilitate 
communication among Turkic-speaking peoples. For the time being, Republican Turkish 
is seen as the only potential language to play the role of lingua franca (Tryjarski, 1998, p .. 
I l 0). 
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Today, there are 25 (lsayev, 1977, p. 80) closely related languages in the region 
and they differ in terms of their status and functional ability. Language reform is one of 
the initial stages of the social, political and economic transformations in the region. The 
reform in the post-Soviet Central Asia is being driven by forces, which I have 
summarized and grouped into two sets of motivations or reasons: juridical reasons, and 
socio-cultural (Neroznak, 1996, p. 5). 
Juridical motivations 
Juridical reasons for language reform are explicitly and implicitly revealed in the 
law on national languages and are associated with the protection of the rights of people to 
preserve and maintain their culture, traditions and languages (Neroznak, 1996, p. 5). 
Languages in Central Asia are divided into two large groups, titular and minority. 
Neroznak defines "titular language" as "a language of an ethnos, whose name is used to 
identify a specific national or state system (Neroznak, 1999, p. 4). Despite their 
multicultural and multilingual compositions, the states in Central Asia declared titular 
languages (Kyrgyz, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen) official and adopted policies, 
which were aimed at enhancing the role of native languages and improving their use in 
all spheres of state administration and at all other levels However, they differ in terms of 
their attitudes toward minorities (who the minorities are) and their language rights 
(Glenn, 1999; Fouse, 2000; Hunter, 1996), 
ln Kyrgyzstan, the language law of 1991 proclaimed Kyrgyz the official language 
of the country and caused anxiety amongst the Russians and representatives of minor 
ethnicities. The most controversial element of the law was Article 8, which required 
management and professional staff, many of whom are Slavs, to have the ability to speak 
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Kyrgyz to their workers and clients (Huskey, 1997). Today, despite nationalistic 
movements, Kyrgyzstan is more inclined to bilingualism with Russian as a second 
language component. This tendency is extensively described by Anderson, J., whose 
research for 1999 traces the process oflanguage planning in Kyrgyzstan back to 1989. 
Russian is not a state language in Kyrgyzstan, but according to 1996 amendment to the 
Constitution, "Russian may be used as an official language in predominantly Russian-
speaking areas" and "vital areas of Kyrgyzstan's national economy" (Anderson, 1999, p. 
48; Smith, 1999, p. 201). 
Kazakhstan's language policy is formulated to meet the interests of Kazak and 
Russians, who are a major ethnicity in the republic. The first language law of 1989 
named Kazak: as the state language and the Russian as the language of interethnic 
communication. After a series of protests and demonstrations of Russian people, 
legislative amendments of 1995 changed the status of the Russian to fill official language 
to be used in certain sectors of economy (Glenn, 1999, p. 112). The new Constitution, 
which was ratified in 1995, acknowledged the status of Kazakh as the state language and 
the official status of Russian in public institutions and local governments. 
Some governments are going very fast in implementing transitional reforms. 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are building monolingual societies based only on Uzbek 
and Turkmen. The language law in Uzbekistan was passed in October 1989 and 
proclaimed Uzbek as the state language. Russian-speaking communities were given eight 
years (from 1989 to 1997) to master the Uzbek language to effectively operate in their 
workplaces (Fouse, 2000). A decision was also made to introduce Latin script gradually 
before 2005 (Smith, 1999, p. 202). At the corpus level, purification appears to be ar1 
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important part of Uzbekistan's language policy. Vocabulary of Uzbek language is re-
examined to remove loan words that are believed to have been borrowed from Russian. 
Purification threatens such terms as "aeroport' (airport), "kvartira" (apartment), 
"respublika" (republic), which have become almost native in Uzbek language 
(Makhmudov, l 999, p. 270). 
In May 1990, Turkmenistan adopted the Language Law, which ascribed Turkrnen 
language an official status and placed it on an even level with Russian (Fouse, 2000, p. 
302). According to Fierman (1997), there might be some opposition between Turkmen 
and Uzbek languages in terms of their use in education, mass, media and administration 
in Turkmenistan's areas under Uzbek people. 
As a state language, Tajik is a major component of Tajikistan's national policy 
after 1989. The policy is largely built on the aspirations to restore the historical links to 
languages spoken beyond Tajikistan's borders. Considering the links between Tajik and 
Persian (Tehran and Kabul Persian), the policy makers support adoption of Arabic 
alphabet for use in writing Tajik. Tajikistan's intention is to become a monolingual 
society by drawing in Persian to replace Russian and Uzbek influences (Atkin, 1995, p. 
131-132). Russian is deprived off all privileges, including its status of a language for 
interethnic communication. If Tajikistan ever adopts a bilingual policy, then the second 
language will be Uzbek, which is spoken by a significant part of its population (Atkin, 
1995, p. 132). Atkin's research is complemented by the findings of the study that Fouse 
conducted on language situation in Tajikistan in 2000. According to Fouse, Tajikistan 
government is taking a relatively gradual approach to the language transition, postponing 
the alphabet shift and proclaiming Russian as the second state language (Fouse, 2000). 
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Socio-cultural factors 
Socio-cultural aspects of language planning include cultural values and imply that 
language is a cultural heritage of people. They are associated with people's desire to 
preserve and maintain their ethnic and cultural identities. In the context of Central Asia, 
this is an issue related to both dominant and minority languages with a particular focus, 1 
think, on the latter. Taking this factor as a main goal, language planning may invoke such 
variables as language spread in terms of dominant languages and language survival for 
minority languages (Neroznak, 1999, p. 5). 
Therefore, discussion of socio-cultural aspects of language planning in a diverse 
multicultural context of Central Asia will demonstrate that not all the variables of 
language planning are implemented as smoothly as status planning. Spread of titular 
languages affects minority communities and schools forcing them to adjust to new 
linguistic environment. Efforts are being made to help them to regain their positions in 
public domains at all levels. Today much emphasis is put to the development of schools 
with indigenous language of instruction. This is evidenced by the recent trend, which is 
directed toward expanding education and publishing in the national languages (Fouse, 
2000). 
After having been denied access to the Islamic past for so many years, the 
national elite and people in Central Asia are turning to their roots. The intention is to 
revive Islam and recapture historical and cultural traditions in order to restore lost 
elements of the national identity. For this reason, status planning and language spread are 
being accompanied by some variables of corpus planning" Kaplan defines "corpus 
planning" as "aspects of language planning, which are primarily linguistic and hence 
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internal to language" (Kaplan, 1997, p. 38). In the context of Central Asia, corpus 
planning implies orthographic, phonological, lexical and stylistic changes and 
innovations that need to be introduced to titular languages. For instance, interregional 
scholarly collaboration of the early 1990s was directed at purifying the languages through 
"dropping Russian accretions and restoring native terminology (Kreindler, 1995, p. 199). 
Attempts are made to renew interest in Arabic language and alphabet For instance, 
Tajikistan is returning to the use of Farsi and modified Arabic script (Atkin, 1997; Fouse, 
2000). I think that in terms of current linguistic situation, Kreindler's study is heavily 
built on the legally documented but unimplemented aspirations of the local governments. 
Kreindler asserts that most nationalities in the region are returning to the use of the Latin 
scripts. However, this does not reflect the real situation. "Aspirations versus reality" 
reveals lack of material basis and practical preparedness for alphabetical transition. 
Fouse's study on language issues in post-communist Central Asia was carried out in 
2000. The results of the study show that, despite the aspirations and intentions, the 
process of alphabetic shift and full conversion to indigenous languages is stagnating 
because of lack of funds. At the time of independence and adoption of language laws in 
the early 1990s, all five countries set target dates for the transformation (mostly before 
2000). Today, they have realized impossibility of fast transformation and are extending 
the target dates. For instance, year 1996 was a target date frx Tajik becoming the only 
language in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan targeted year l 997 for full conversion. Both 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have extended the target date, whereas legislation in 
Kazakhstan eliminated such in the final version of the language law. According to the 
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draft, ethnic Kazakhs were supposed to learn Kazakh by 2001, while Russians were 
expected to master it by 2006 (Fouse, 2000, p. 239-309) 
Language in education after independence 
The aspirations of people in the post-Soviet countries to revive the national and 
language identities are described by Fouse (2000) as their desire to take control of their 
own destiny and make their own decisions in cultural and educational affairs. Current 
educational policy in Central Asian countries combines both language status and corpus 
issues in their intention to reshape the language situation in the region. The objective is to 
replace Russian domination by a society, which emphasizes and builds on the strengths of 
the indigenous languages. This is particularly true for Central Asia, where all five 
countries proclaimed native languages (Kyrgyz, Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen) the 
official languages and adopted policies, which are aimed at enhancing the role of native 
languages and improving their use in all spheres of state administration and at all other 
levels (Fouse, 2000). 
In the context of education, Central Asian countries proclaimed interest in 
transforming the Soviet education system into a new system with more freedom and 
flexibility. In all five republics native language (literature and history accordingly) 
instruction has been increased in all secondary schools at the expense of Russian 
language and other politicized subjects inherited from Soviet curriculum. However, wide 
scale introduction of Kyrgyz as a medium of instruction revealed shortage of textbooks in 
Kyrgyz. Supported by foreign donors, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Education organized a 
series of competitions for the design of textbooks in the first years of independence, The 
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situation has improved by the mid- l 990s, when state managed to allocate funds for the 
publication of quality and widely accessible textbooks (Olcott, 1997, p. 141) 
As for higher education institutions, the situation is slightly different. For 
instance, Russian still remains the dominant language of higher learning in Kyrgyzstan, 
although instruction in Kyrgyz is increasing gradually (Olcott, 1997, p. 141) Russian-
only instruction is available for the Russian-speaking population at the Kyrgyz-Slavic 
university, which was initiated by the president of Kyrgyzstan. 
In Kazakhstan, the language of instruction remains particularly sensitive and 
unresolved because of equal numbers of both Kazakhs and the Russian-speaking 
population. Like in Kyrgyzstan, in the early 1990s the schools in Kazakhstan operated in 
Russian because of shortage of textbooks in Kazakh language, and teachers of Kazakh 
language. In the area of higher learning, the trend is similar to the one in other Central 
Asian countries. "Kazakhification" of the universities grants the native students certain 
advantages in the selection and admission process. Nevertheless, Russian still serves as a 
language of instruction in most subjects at the universities (Olcott, 1997, p. 32-33) 
In Turkmenistan, the Turkmen language requirement has been introduced into 
educational institutions at all levels. Starting from January 2000, TurkrnenistaJ1 started a 
process of gradual switch to Latin alphabet, which represents a modified version of 
Turkish alphabet. (Nissman, 1997). As a result, 77 percent of comprehensive 
( combination of primary and secondary) schools teach in Turkmen, although there are 
still schools that use Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek as a medium of instrnction. Overall, 
Turkmenistan is experiencing the same problems that other Central Asian countries have 
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encountered: shortage of language teachers, lack or inadequate textbooks and 
instructional materials, etc (Clark et all, 1997, p. 322) 
Instruction in the Uzbek language in the schools of authoritarian Uzbekistan has 
been increased since the adoption of the language law. The greater number of hours is 
devoted to the study of Uzbek in both Uzbek-language and Russian-language schook 
Compared to this, number of hours devoted to Russian has decreased. Uzbek language is 
now introduced at the Russian-language schools at an earlier stage - during the second 
half of the first grade. As for higher educational institutions, more courses are being 
offered in Uzbek. It is also observable that more and more students are enrolled in groups 
with Uzbek language as a medium of instruction (Fierman, 1995). As for minority 
languages, Uzbek government deals with them in the same authoritarian way. Number of 
secondary schools in predominantly Tajik-inhabited Samarkand and Bukhara has been 
gradually decreasing since the late 1960s. Post-independence civil war in Tajikistan has 
just exacerbated this process. There was a moment, when Uzbek government closed the 
Samarkand University, which had a long history of teaching in Tajik. Thus, Uzbekistan is 
moving away from its Soviet background by removing Russian from public domains, and 
suppressing other minority languages. In the long run, English is seen as the language of 
international communication in Uzbekistan (Lubin, 1997, p. 419-421) 
In Tajikistan, Tajik language is strengthening its position in public domains under 
the increasing influence of Persian. Having gained independence, Tajikistan increased 
teaching of Tajik in all secondary schools, where Russian, Uzbek and Kyrgyz served as a 
medium of instruction. Shahrani's as welJ as Muriel Atkin's research on Tajikistan 
clearly shows that the country intends to build a monolingual society by drawing in 
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Persian to replace Russian and Uzbek influences. Therefore, the purification is aimed at 
removing the Russian borrowings from the vocabulary. For instance, Persian 
"bimariston" ("hospital") has replaced "bol'nitsa" in Russian, etc. Like in other Central 
Asian republics, Tajiks, particularly educated elites are advocating for the elimination of 
Russianized way spelling the native personal names. In short, the intention is to remove 
the suffix "-ov" added to the last names (Atkin, 1995, p. 131-132; Shahrani, 1994). The 
problem of textbook shortage in post-war Tajikistan is much more critical than in other 
Central Asian countries. 
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Ethno-social structure: Role of language 
This section of the project is devoted to examining the impact of language on 
ethnic and social phenomena like in-migration and out-migration. The nature of the study 
is exploratory, and therefore, the intention is not to deeply examine various reasons for 
diverging interethnic relations that underlie migratory processes in the region. In pre-
Soviet Central Asia, language was not a cause of tensions between different ethnicities, 
but was a part of the settlement policy of Tsarist Russia. Language was an important tool 
of nation building during the soviet regime. In terms of the post-Soviet period, my 
intention is to explore whether the changes in the language use patterns are causing the 
current out-migration from the region. Despite multiplicity of reasons, out-migrants tend 
to consider the linguistic changes as the major cause of their decision to leave the region 
(Delo, 2001 ). 
Central Asia has always been multiethnic and multicultural. It has always been 
and still is viewed as one geopolitical unity, which is integrated by its geographic 
territory, historical background, economic relations, ethnocultural and religious 
commonalties. These commonalties affect people's lifestyle and values and make them 
racially and culturally different from other nationalities, which formed the so-called 
"Soviet people". Ethnic and cultural diversity of Central Asia was enormously affected 
by different economic and political policies of Tsarist Russia and Soviet regime. 
In-migration 
First European settlements in Central Asia 
Literature on interethnic relations in pre-Soviet Central Asia has no tendency to 
consider the language issues as the cause of tensions between different ethnicities. It will 
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talk about the first migrants, which were brought by the settlement policy of Tsarist 
Russia. Since the purpose of the study is to examine the relationships between historically 
Turkic nationalities and European in-migrants, the paper will not discuss frequent 
intertribal conflicts and raids because of territorial disagreements. 
At the time of Russian expansion into Central Asia, it was a religiously 
consolidated region, although there were some cultural and linguistic differences. 
Cultural differences were due to the lifestyle, which divided them into nomads and 
sedentary people: Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen were nomads while Uzbeks and Tajiks 
belonged to the sedentary group of people. Kazakhs of today were divided into tribes, 
which consisted of multiple clans. The Kyrgyz were also organized according to tribes 
and clans. A complex tribal structure also characterized the Uzbeks, who distinguished 
themselves according to clans and tribal lines. Turkmen social structure was organized by 
family and clan (Pierce, 1960, p. 9-12) This kind of cultural, linguistic and religious 
consolidation explains their strong tie to the area, reluctance to migrate and 
distinctiveness from Europeans. 
Annexation of Turkestan by Russia resulted in economic and social changes in the 
region and transformed its political outlook. (Khalfin, 1965; Roy, 2000). The conquest 
was then followed by the settlement policy. Russian and other Slavic settlers began to 
enter Kazak-inhabited territories as early as the late 18th century when almost all Kazaks 
were still nomadic. In-migration of Slavs was encouraged through various policies, 
including establishment of the schooling system, where Russian language, culture and 
values were the focus of education (Pierce, 1960). 
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In the case of Kyrgyzstan, peak of the pre-Soviet migration took place by the 
early 1880s, when about 3 .500 Russian and Ukrainian settlers started to settle in the 
northern territories. First settlers to the current territory under the Uzbek and Tajik were 
emancipated peasants from rural Russia. Majority of them was driven by the 1891 famine 
in Russia. By 1911, the number of rural setters in Syr-Darya region made up 45.000 
(Rywkin, 1990, p. 16) 
Migration was encouraged by the land allocation policy of the Russian 
government, which was detrimental to local population and led to impoverishment. 
(Glenn, 1999, p. 5). Tension between the Russian colonizers and indigenous people was 
aggravated by unfair appropriation of grazing pastures and much of the arable fertile land 
by the migrants. Expropriation of land resulted in disastrous famines among the 
indigenous population between 1910 and 1913 (Rywkin, 1999, p. 16). Another factor that 
added to interethnic tension was the forceful measures undertaken in regard to Kyrgyz 
and Kazakh to make them adopt a sedentary way of life (Pierce, 1960, p. 118-120, 204-
205). I do not think that Pierce's argument n colonizers and indigenous people was 
aggravated by unfair appropriation of grazing pastures and much of the arable fertile land 
by the migrants. Expropriation of land resulted in disastrous famines among the 
indigenous population between 1910 and 1913 (Rywkin, 1999, p. 16). Another factor that 
at added to interethnic tension was the forceful measures undertaken in regard to 
Kyrgyz and Kazakh to make them adopt a sedentary way of life (Pierce, 1960, p. 118-
120, 204-205). Kyrgyz people showed their resistance through akyns (bards), who 
warned that any change against the existing social order was against the will of god. 
(1954, Central Asian Review, 1955, p.192) Indigenous anti-Russian organizations of that 
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time include "Young Bukharans", "Young Turks" in Bukhara, and "Alash Orda" in the 
Kazakh steppe. The leaders of these organizations organized several revolts, the most 
prominent ones among which were the Andijan revolt of 1876, revolt of 1916, initiated 
by the Kyrgyz and Kazakh. Revolt of 1916 was a very important event in the Kyrgyz 
history. It cost 100,000 Kyrgyz lives and had serious economic consequences (Rywkin, 
1990, p. 13-17) 
Russian authorities attempted to reform Turkic culture. For instance, they 
introduced European-style education in the Kazakh steppes. There were Russian-native 
schools in Fergana region. These educational reforms benefited a number of influential 
members of the indigenous elite, who came to know and admire Russian culture. For 
instance, Chokan Valikhanov, a Kazakh ethnographer, who devoted much of his work to 
the study of Kyrgyz people and culture. However, for the majority, Russian rule and 
people remained alien, and even were actively resented. Similar feelings had Russians 
and Ukrainians, who behaved superior and showed antipathy towards non-Christians with 
their Asian-Muslim morals and habits. This unfriendly environment remained unchanged 
until 1917, when the Soviets came to impose a new Soviet culture. 
Language as a tool of nation building during the Soviet period 
For most of the Soviet period there was a remarkable degree of harmony between 
the different ethnicities in Central Asia. On an individual level, there were instances of 
discrimination and harassment, but there was no room for institutionalized racism under 
the Soviet system. However, social boundaries between the different groups remained 
(Wixman, 1991, p. 159-183) Wixman's field research on Muslim-Turkic versus Slavic­
Christian relations in Uzbekistan discloses interesting aspects of these relations. The 
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Uzbek showed a double attitude toward Slavs by dividing them into two groups. They 
behave cordially and friendly toward the Slavs, who have a long history of living in the 
region. They resent the more recent Slav migrants, who failed to respect local people, 
local language, culture, and traditions (Wixman, 1991, p. 167, 178) Therefore, before 
speaking about the ethnic situation in Soviet Central Asia, I would like to mention some 
sources of migration, i.e. to show what attracted migrants to the region. 
There were a variety of reasons that brought immigrants to Central Asia during 
the Soviet period. Literature written during the Soviet system indicates mostly economic 
and political reasons, which became the source of the large Russian presence in the 
present total population of Central Asia. These reasons include collectivization of 
agriculture and industrialization in all five republics, cultivation of virgin lands in 
Kazakhstan, deportation of entire ethnic groups (Volga Germans, Koreans, Poles, Greeks, 
Crimean Tatars, Kabardins and Balkars, Chechens and lngushs, Karachays )5 to the 
region, evacuation of factories and plants during the World War II. The first settlers were 
Komsomol 6 members from western Ukraine, the Moldavia, and Byelorussia, from Tatar 
Republic. The majority of them were young, without families and were machinery drivers 
and agronomists, railway construction workers. According to Sheeny's statistics, at the 
time of virgin-land boom Kazakhstan accepted from 220,000 to 250,000 settlers annually 
to work in industry or on virgin lands (Sheeny, 1966, p. 321). The disastrous earthquake 
in 1966 in Uzbekistan had caused another influx of non-Asians, who came to the country 
to help with the reconstruction of Tashkent. 
5 These were "punished people", who were believed to be unreliable or accused of collaboration with the 
Nazi army during the World War II. 
6 Young Communist League 
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Besides political and economic motives, there were many other reasons for the in-
migration to the region. Most of the immigrants were attracted by the more congenial 
climate, better living conditions, and employment opportunities in Central Asia (Sheeny, 
1966; Rywkin, 1990; Olcott, 1996) Majority of Russians in Central Asia did not come 
from places like Moscow or Saint Petersburg, which offer more in terms of culture and 
living conditions, but rather from rural areas, where situation is even worse than in 
Central Asia. In case of Uzbekistan, migrants comment that Uzbekistan has certain 
advantages in terms of climate, food, housing, and other services (Wixman, 1991, p. 
180). 
No matter what the reasons were, migrations processes have changed the ethnic 
composition of the region. The particular feature of this migration was that all incomers 
were Europeans, Caucasians, or non-Asians. Majority of them were Slavs. The 
proportion of Slavs varied from republic to republic. For instance, in Uzbekistan the 
Russian population made up 8.3 percent in 1994. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
always had a higher proportion of Slavs: 37.0 percent of Russians and 5.2 percent 
Ukrainians in Kazakhstan, and 21.5 percent Russians and 2.5 percent Ukrainians in 
Kyrgyzstan, dating from the pre-Soviet period. Russians in Turkmenistan comprise 9.8 
percent, while in Tajikistan two-thirds of3.5 percent (1989 prewar data7) Russian 
population is said to have fled during the civil war (Undeland, 1994, p. 31-93) As a 
result, today Kyrgystan has 118 nationalities, and there are 123 nationalities in 
Uzbekistan. (Krag, 1984, p. 64; Wright, 2000) Immigrants changed the ethnic balance in 
the region and spread different customs, attitudes and modes of behavior. 
7 Post-Soviet independence in Tajikistan started with civil war in 1991 
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Widespread introduction of Russian into Central Asian native societies heavily 
affected the ethnic, linguistic and settlement structure and practices. These changes are 
interestingly discussed by Shahrani (1994), whose position as an outsider and his 
comparison between Afghanistan and Sovietized Muslims in Central Asia helps to clearly 
see the changes occurred in the region. Shahrani's identifies two ways Soviet-Russian 
language policy affected the ethnic and linguistic structure. First way presents a mixture 
of Soviet nationality policy and concept of "Soviet people". According to the Soviet 
nationality policy, all nationalities enjoy equal rights for self-determination. However, to 
be a Soviet man native people had to learn Russian language, which was seen as the 
language of the Soviet proletariat. As a result, most of the urban natives, particularly 
elites would become fluent Russian speakers without adopting the Russian nationality. 
This dichotomy is often encountered in today's Central Asia, where most of the urban 
native professionals consider Russian as the first language, but are never accepted as 
Russians (Shahrani, 1994, p. 43). 
Second, Russian language became common language of the Soviet states and of 
all the non-Russian nationalities. Russian language became a necessity to receive higher 
education, and to become professionally promoted in the urban areas. This policy resulted 
in a negative attitude toward native culture and languages among Russian-speaking 
natives. Shahrani asserts that this category of native people resent their native language 
and culture for they have an association with rural folk (Shahrani, 1994, p. 41 ). He also 
indicates that there were a great number of parents sending their children to Russian-
language schools. I think that Shahrani's research fails to name some current practical 
reasons for Russian language dominance in the region. Russian is still a lingua franca in 
52 
Central Asia. Higher education still heavily relies on Russian and there are universities 
and colleges, where education is available only in Russian. Russian is essential for 
anyone who travels beyond the boundaries of his or her national territory in the region. 
Out-migration 
In terms of ethnic relationship in the region, post-Soviet constitutions of the 
Central Asian countries guarantee equal rights before the law, in education and in 
employment, for all members of society. Freedom of conscience, along with other basic 
freedoms, is also stated in the constitutions. Full citizenship is open to permanent 
residents of the new states regardless of ethnic origin, religion or language. Turkmenistan 
has granted Russian population the right for dual citizenship (Hunter, 1996, p. 44-47; 
Fouse, 2000; Olcott, 1996;) 
Nevertheless, current situation in the region shows that tensions do not end with 
the statements in the constitutions. Linguistic variations initiated by the post-Soviet 
Central Asian countries are causing many problems in the sphere of interethnic relations. 
Starting point of the tension was the introduction and use of the native languages 
in schools, enterprises and organizations, widespread teaching in native languages, 
widespread introduction in non-native primary and secondary schools. These new 
initiatives affected ethnic composition of the region differently. They allowed major 
ethnic groups to regain self-consciousness, and made groups like Russians and other 
Slavs lose their dominating position in the society and find themselves a minority. 
Economic and financial crisis, unemployment, high inflation rates, degrading living 
conditions and other drastic changes in the political and social life added to tense 
interethnic relations and caused out-migration. However, despite multiplicity of 
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economic reasons, many out-migrants tend to see the language issue as a cause of 
conflict. For instance, language policy in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan was seen as the 
major motive for out-migration, which will be discussed further (Undeland, 1994) 
Critchlow's study of nationalism in Uzbekistan also indicates that ethnicity and language 
were the reasons for ethnic conflicts and misunderstandings in the country, although the 
examples are often related to the Soviet period (Critchlow, 1991, 144-148) 
Greatest challenge is maintaining ethnic stability and harmony is presented by 
Russians, who make up 9, 652,701 in the region (Undeland, 1994, p. 16) Intention of 
titular nations to redress the previous unfair policies is viewed as discriminatory by the 
Slavs. They consider the priority given to the native languages is a discrimination against 
non-native speakers. For them, language laws of almost all five countries limit access to 
higher education, to civil services and high-ranking government positions. They feel 
insecure about the overall changing situation in the region, and therefore, they respond to 
these socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations in the form of emigration 
(Undeland, 1994; Glenn, 1999; Anderson, 1999) 
However, actual studies on the issue of out-migration in Central Asia prove that 
language issue is not a major cause of the interethnic antagonism. For instance, 
Kosmarskaia's research on out-migration from Kyrgyzstan, and Yerofeyeva' s study of 
migration from Kazakhstan broadly discuss the changes in the lives of the Russian-
speaking people after the disintegration of the Soviet regime. One of the goals of the 
research was to find out why, when, where and how many people was leaving the newly 
independent Central Asian countries. Kosmarskaia's findings are based in the findings of 
empirical evidence that she collected during five sociological expeditions to Kyrgyzstan 
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between 1992 and 1998. The survey on language issues demonstrates that language 
policy is not a cause for out-migration. Therefore, 32.2 percent of respondents were 
unwilling to learn the native language, as they do not see language discrimination, and 
are sure that Russian language will retain its dominant position in the country. For them, 
major reasons for out-migration are deteriorating economic situation and instable political 
environment (Kosmarskaia, 1999, p. 189-195) Yerofeyeva' research was conducted in 
Northern Kazakhstan, which is largely populated by the Slavs. This situation in 
Kazakhstan is different in many ways: high concentration of Slavs in the northern region, 
and their close link to Russia. Language issues are often intermingled with politics. 
Russian speakers are more inclined to stay in the country and fight for their rights or 
insist on the partition of the country. The Russian minority id deeply rooted in 
Kazakhstan and it would be unrealistic to massively leave for Russia. For instance, 32. 1 
percent of Russian population in Ust-Kamenogorsk, and 27. 8 percent of Russians in 
Petropavlovsk are firm in their decision to stay and fight for their rights. (Y erofeyeva, 
1999, p. 1 77) Both Kosmarskaia' s and Y erofeyeva' s research indicate that psychological 
impact of suddenly becoming a minority presents another reason of out-migration. 
These findings are supported by Ginzburg's research, which also shows that 
language alone cannot cause massive out-migration. Unlike Germany and Israel with 
their repatriation policy, Russia is unable to provide material and financial resources for 
its returnees in economically well off regions. In most cases Asian Russians may find 
themselves in deserted and economically poor regions far away from urbanized centers. It 
is not their intention to leave Central Asia just to rehabilitate or restore Russia's stagnated 
economy. On the other hand, Russians in Asia are now culturally different from Russians 
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of Russia, who treat them as refugees or competitors for scarce economic and financial 
resources. Therefore, many are of them are returning back (Ginzburg, 1993, p. 6; 
Kosmarskaia, 1999) 
Similar findings were achieved in the process of studies conducted by the western 
researchers. Having examined the language problems in the region, Fierman notes, there 
is a tension across the region, but language does not seem to be primary cause of conflict. 
Language may become a contributory factor to conflicts that often arise from economic 
and political issues like division of water resources, re-demarcation of boundaries 
between the states, etc. (Fierman, 1997). It is also supported by Rywkin, who states 
"migration would not take place without a combination of economic pressures and 
material incentives" (Rywkin, 1990, p. 71) In the case of Tajikistan, "language policy 
was far from constituting the major reason of the emigration from the country. 
Obviously, it was the war that caused it" (OSI/Soros)8 To support this statement, this 
study of the language situation in Tajikistan brings in actual figures on migration among 
Tajiks. These research findings and my own experience of a citizen of Kyrgyzstan allow 
me to assume that minorities in Central Asia are in a non-discriminatory position 
compared to those who live and work in Baltic republics, particularly in Latvia and 
Estonia where language has become the major instrument of dealing with the non-titular 
people or non-citizens (Alpatov, 1997; Ozolins, 2000). As was mentioned earlier, 
transitional reforms allowed minorities in the region to regain self-consciousness and 
raised self-awareness of their identities. It was also noted that each state in the region has 
its own unique approach to the solution of issues related to minority languages. 
8 http://www. soros. org/fm p2/htm 1/laws/Zakons/Ta j ikistan/Taj Engl.htm I 
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Minority groups have secondary schools with instruction in their native language. 
They enjoy good positions in terms of employment, education, housing, social protection, 
although there might be some deviations in some countries, which should not be 
generalized to the whole region. Minorities in Central Asia feel safe due to balanced 
policy of the republics to retain interethnic peace and harmony in the region. They are 
now united into the so-called People's Assemblies, which are operating now in all states 
of Central Asia. These unions were formed to retain and strengthen interethnic unity and 
understanding. Assemblies connect different ethnic groups, who hope for their needs and 
interests to be accounted in decision-making processes in different fields of economy. 
They also hope that the Assemblies will assist the governments to develop programs 
aimed at retaining and rehabilitating cultural values of each ethnic group (Alpatov, 1997). 
Therefore, minorities intended to stay are adjusting to new environment, encouraging 
their children to learn other languages alongside Central Asian major languages. Stable 
and friendly interethnic relations in Central Asia are largely due to traditional tolerance of 
people in the region, and a long experience of living together, sharing and respecting each 
other's values. 
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Conclusion 
Only IO years has passed since the states in the region gained independence 
gained in 1991, and therefore, there is no way of knowing the real impact of these 
language policy and planning measures on the educational system and interethnic 
relationships in the region yet. Therefore, I think that the context described in the project 
is characteristic of the chaotic situations that take place during political and socio-
economic transformations. 
Ironically, current language policies in Central Asian countries are at the opposite 
end of what the language policy used to be during the Soviet era. The Soviet system was 
the proponent of the Russian language, whereas post-Soviet transformations emphasize 
the revival of indigenous languages to replace Russian. Nativization or ethnocentric 
nationalism is the tendency that makes them identical in their approach to the problems of 
linguistic and cultural revitalization. All the stages that Central Asian countries went 
through demonstrate that they have full potential to promote and strengthen their own 
languages. 
Financial and organizational constraints present another factor that makes the 
situation identical. Very often, limitations in the ability to implement language planning 
in Central Asian countries are caused by lack of funds to support the language revival 
process. Apart from laws and verbal aspirations, very little has been done to persistently 
and subsequently improve standards and usage of languages. This is particularly true for 
Kyrgyzstan (Vechemii Bishkek, 2000) The government and relevant institutions are not 
making serious efforts to make the policy work. Lack of funds and lack of native-
language teachers resulted in the stopping of language courses for non-native people 
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working in public institutions. There is also a need for technical literature to be used in 
the documentation in the native language. 
Nevertheless, despite these similarities, each state in the region has its own unique 
approach to the solution of issues related to dominant and minority languages. I think that 
success in achieving ethnic, linguistic and cultural harmony in the country significantly 
depends on its economic standing and the ability of its government to prioritize the 
utilization of scarce resources according to the needs of the nation. 
For instance, in the case of Kazakhstan, its geopolitical and economic position in 
the region shapes and politicizes the language issues. Kazakhstan's language policy is 
formulated to meet the interests of Kazak and Russians, because the latter comprise a 
major part of the country's population. 
Despite nationalistic movements, Kyrgyzstan is more inclined to bilingualism 
with Russian as a second language component. Anderson, whose research of 1999 traces 
the process oflanguage planning in Kyrgyzstan back to 1989, extensively describes this 
tendency. Russian is not a state language in Kyrgyzstan, but according to 1996 
amendment to the Constitution, "Russian may be used as an official language in 
predominantly Russian-speaking areas" and "vital areas of Kyrgyzstan's national 
economy" (Anderson, 1999, p. 48) 
Tajik as a state language after 1989 is a major component of Tajikistan's national 
policy. The policy is largely built on the aspirations to restore the historical links to 
languages spoken beyond Tajikistan's borders. Tajikistan's intention is to become a 
monolingual society by drawing in Persian to replace Russian and Uzbek influences. 
Russian is deprived of privileges, including its status of a language for interethnic 
59 
communication. If Tajikistan ever adopts a bilingual policy, then the second language 
will be Uzbek, which is spoken by a significant part of its population (Atkin, p. 132). 
As was mentioned in the previous sections, some governments are going very fast 
in implementing transitional reforms. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are building 
monolingual societies based only on Uzbek and Turk.men. In Turkmenistan, the Turk.men 
language requirement has been introduced into educational institutions at all levels. 
Starting from January 2000, Turkmenistan switched to Latin alphabet, which represents a 
modified version of Turkish alphabet. The new alphabet is believed to have a potential to 
fully transfer the richness and beauty of the Turk.men language. Purification policy is 
aimed at cleansing the Turk.men language of borrowings and preserving the originality of 
the language. The Turk.men government assures that school reforms will not be used to 
harass minor ethnic groups on ethnic and religious grounds. An important ethnic group in 
Turkmenistan is presented by Uzbeks (9%), who live predominantly in the areas 
bordering Uzbekistan. (Fierman, 1997, p. 2) 
The language law of Uzbekistan affected not only Russians, but also the urban 
intelligentsia, who were educated in Russian and, therefore, were more proficient in 
Russian than in Uzbek. Language reform in de-russifying Uzbekistan is being promoted 
also through hiring and firing practices, which emphasize knowledge of the local 
language (Dollerup, 1998, p. 144). Instruction in the Uzbek language in the schools has 
been increased since the adoption of the language law. The greater number of hours is 
devoted to the study of Uzbek in both Uzbek-language and Russian-language schools. 
Compared to this, number of hours devoted to Russian has decreased. Uzbek language is 
now introduced at the Russian-language schools at an earlier stage - during the second 
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half of the first grade. As for higher educational institutions, more courses are being 
offered in Uzbek. It is also observable that more and more students are emolled in 
schools with Uzbek language as a medium of instruction (Fierman, 1995). 
Overall, all major stages of language planning and construction in the region 
show that schools served as a laboratory for Soviet and post-Soviet experiments, although 
there were both gains and losses from them. Scripts were changed twice, turning people 
into an illiterate mass in a moment. Perpetuating the concept of "Soviet people" through 
Russian language, Soviet language policy contributed to the decline of the status and the 
role of native languages in the schools. Combined with political and socio-economic 
factors, post-Soviet language policy has had a series of negative consequences: lack of 
textbooks in native languages, lack of qualified teachers in native languages, out-
migration of Russian speaking population, etc. 
The current Central Asian model of policy development and implementation is 
largely inherited from the Soviet system, which regarded language policy as a part of the 
government's political activity in the context of antagonism and the political competition 
between capitalism and socialism. Currently, the governments in Central Asia are 
confronting challenges including the role of language in regaining national identity in the 
republics. Although each state has already adopted language laws, public movements 
demonstrate that language in the region remains sensitive and umesolved. 
Recommendations 
As we see, the policies that Central Asian countries are pursuing present three 
possible options: monoligualism, bilingualism, and multilingualism. The future of the 
language situation in Central Asia is difficult to predict because of limited period of time 
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(10 years only) that has passed since independence in 1991, and lack of complete 
information. Nevertheless, analysis of problems and difficulties encountered within this 
period, and findings of scholarly research in the field make it possible to make some 
preliminary recommendations. 
The main point to be considered in decision-making is the fact that Central Asia is 
a home for more than 20 nationalities. Each ethnic group has its own language, its own 
history, customs, traditions, and lifestyle, and this needs to be taken into account in policy 
making on language issues. To achieve this, optimal forms and methods of integrating 
languages have to be determined under current multilingual conditions of the region. 
It is also important that the transition process should account for traditional 
bilingualism in the region, which was always there before the Soviets came, and Russian-
N ative bilingualism, which resulted from the Soviet language policy. The majority of 
indigenous people in the region are bilingual - they speak their own native language and 
Russian or one of the other indigenous languages. Bilingualism is spread in a 
differentiated manner depending in the region. For instance, indigenous people in 
Northern Kazakhstan and Northern Kyrgyzstan and capital cities of other countries are 
bilingual speaking native language and Russian. People speak Kyrgyz and Uzbek in the 
south of Kyrgyzstan. Uzbeks and Turkmens living in the border areas between 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan speak Turkmen and Uzbek accordingly. 
At the same, it is important to mention possibility of multiculturalism in Central 
Asian republics. Matthias Koenig extensively discusses the option of multiculturalism in 
Kyrgyzstan's context. Multiculturalism implies ethnic equality, under which everybody is 
offered knowledge on history, culture, and basic information on ethnic groups, who live 
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together in the society and whose attention is focused on the value of cultural diversity 
(Koenig, 2000). In the context of Central Asian republics, I think it is important to note 
that multiculturalism requires a lot of monetary and non-monetary costs. Currently the 
local governments are hardly able to invest the promotion of titular language, never mind 
other minority languages. Another impediment might be aspirations of native people, 
who have strong hopes of their mother tongues acquiring an adequate position and status 
in the society. Therefore I think that multiculturalism presents an option, which needs 
first to be thoroughly researched and publicly discussed. 
In terms of minority issues in the region, the recommendation would be to 
encourage them to stay, adjust to new socio-economic environment, encourage to learn 
other languages alongside Central Asian major languages. I believe that stable interethnic 
relations in Central Asia are largely due to traditional tolerance of people in the region, 
and a long experience ofliving together, sharing and respecting each other's values. 
As for education, I think it is important to identify main strategic options of 
activity in the sector. For me, these options include multicultural education, intercultural 
education, bilingual education, multilingual education, education for minorities, etc. I 
think that multicultural education programs would give knowledge on history, culture, 
and basic information on ethnic groups living together in the region. Here, it is important 
that primary attention be focused on the value of cultural diversity. Intercultural 
education programs would be aimed at assisting the development of mutual 
understanding and respect. Minority education programs would provide knowledge of the 
language, culture and history for minorities' children, strengthen their self-respect and 
self-consciousness. 
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Knowing the current situation in Central Asia, I would say that feasibility and 
applicability of a specific option in a particular country depends on the political, 
ideological and economic circumstances that may predetermine the decisions in favor of 
a specific strategy. 
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